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Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent 
misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often threaten the overall 
project viability. This paper investigates the explanations for cost overruns that are given in the 
literature. Overall, four categories of explanations can be distinguished: technical, economic, 
psychological, and political. Political explanations have been seen to be the most dominant 
explanations for cost overruns. Agency theory is considered the most interesting for political 
explanations and an eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-political explanations are 
diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and 
prospect theory), depending on the kind of explanation is considered more appropriate than one 
all-embracing theory.  
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1. Introduction 
Investments in infrastructure are a considerable burden on a country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). For example, in 2005 the Dutch government invested about 8 billion euros (CBS, 2005 in 
KIM, 2007) in infrastructure, amounting to 1.55% of GDP. This is of even greater concern if the 
inefficient allocation of financial resources as the result of decisions based on misinformation are 
                                                        
1 P.O. Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, NL, T: +31(0)152781959, F: +31(0)152782719, E: c.c.cantarelli@tudelft.nl 
2 Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK, T: +44(0)1865288851, F: +44(0)1865288805, E: bent.flyvbjerg@sbs.ox.ac.uk 
3 Part of the research for this paper was carried out while Bent Flyvbjerg was professor at Aalborg University, 
Denmark and Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands 
4 P.O. Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, NL, T: +31(0)152788510, F: +31(0)152782719, E: e.j.e.molin@tudelft.nl 
5 P.O. Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, NL, T: +31(0)152787186, F: +31(0)152782719, E: bertw@tudelft.nl 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 5-18 
Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin and van Wee 
6 
Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects:  
Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness 
 
recognised (Flyvbjerg, 2005b, De Bruijn and Leijten, 2007). Cost estimates are often inaccurate and 
consequently the ranking of projects based on project viability is also inaccurate. Inevitably, this 
means there is a danger that eventually inferior projects are implemented, that resources are used 
which could have been assigned more appropriately, and that projects that are unable to recover 
their costs are implemented. Inaccurate estimates make it particularly difficult to manage large 
projects and often lead to cost overruns, which further increases the burden on the country’s 
GDP. The problem can be summarised as follows: managing large-scale transportation 
infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent misinformation about the costs which results in 
large cost overruns that often threaten overall project viability. Various studies have addressed 
the issue of cost overruns in transportation projects (van Wee, 2007). Some studies, including a 
large database of projects, reach the following conclusions. The Government Accountability 
Office, for example, found that 77% of highway projects in the USA experienced cost escalation 
(in Kaliba et al., 2008). Merewitz (1973) suggests that the average overrun of infrastructure 
projects is a little over 50 percent (Merewitz, 1973). A review by Morris and Hough (1987), which 
covered about 3500 projects, revealed that overruns are the norm, and generally range between 
40 and 200 per cent (Reichelt and Lyneis, 1999). Furthermore, a study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) 
indicates that in 86 percent of the projects cost overruns appear to overrun by an average of 28 
percent.  
The problem is recognised in the literature but the causes and explanations are still ambiguous. 
To the authors’ knowledge, a systematic investigation into the different explanations for cost 
overruns has not yet been conducted. Moreover, insight into the theories underlying these 
explanations has been the subject of only a few studies. A sound theoretical basis is particularly 
important because it substantiates the explanation and provides opportunities to define the 
appropriate cures.  
This paper provides an overview of explanations and their theoretical embeddedness in order to 
gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of cost overruns  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the research methodology, and 
this is followed in section 3 by a description of the causes and explanations for cost overruns for 
each source. The explanations are categorised and further examined in section 4. Section 5 
elaborates on the theoretical embeddedness of the explanations. Finally, section 6 presents the 
main conclusions, addresses the research questions and presents a number of recommendations.  
2. Methodology 
In line with the conventional methodology, the inaccuracy of cost estimates is measured as the 
size of cost overruns. Cost overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs minus estimated costs as a 
percentage of estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted construction costs 
determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted or 
forecasted construction costs determined at the time of the decision to build. Cost estimates 
become more accurate during the project process. However, what is relevant here is the estimate 
known by the decision maker, i.e. the estimate based upon which the decision maker decides 
whether or not to implement the project. A particular moment in time is often taken to represent 
the moment at which the decision to implement the project was made (‘formal decision to build’). 
Cost overruns are generally calculated according to the costs estimated at this ‘formal decision to 
build’ (these are the costs at the initial funding level). However, the decision-making process 
involves several moments at which decisions are made; therefore, references to the formal 
decision to build do not always provide an accurate picture of cost overruns. In some cases, 
parties have committed themselves at an earlier decision-making moment, known as the ‘real 
decision to build’. This situation is referred to as lock-in at the decision-making level. Lock-in 
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influences the magnitude of cost overruns, because the estimated costs at the real decision to 
build are usually lower than those at later stages of the decision-making process (Cantarelli et al. 
2009). This paper concentrates on explanations rather than on causes. In line with the definition in 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), what we mean by ‘cause’ is ‘to result in’; the cause is not the explanation of 
the result. Causes refer to the variables or factors that influence the cost overruns, such as the 
implementation period or the size of the project. Explanations are more general and might 
comprise several causes.  
We define transportation infrastructure projects as follows: ‘Transport infrastructures include 
roads, rail lines, channels, (extensions to) airports and harbours, bridges and tunnels. Of these 
projects it is the ‘hardware’ that is considered, and the “software”,i.e. projects relating to 
deregulations, liberalization, privatization, and so forth is excluded’. The literature did not 
provide one minimum cost level that is generally applied to mark a large-scale project. A large-
scale project is defined in this paper by a minimum cost level of 500 million euros.  
A literature study of explanations and theories that are used to support the explanations was 
carried out. In line with Morris (1990), who concludes in his research that in understanding the 
planning failures, one has to look for a general explanation, the review methodology does not set 
out any restrictions in the search for literature on cost overruns of transportation infrastructure 
projects. It attempts to give an overview of studies that is as complete as possible. Studies 
addressing project performance in general are considered (broad focus) as well as studies 
focusing specifically on cost overruns (narrow focus). Most studies are empirical studies; studies 
that largely use data from observation or experience, i.e. empirical studies give insight into the 
extent of cost overruns based on data from real projects. Table 1 presents the different studies.  
Table 1. Overview sources of literature 
 Various categories of projects 
including transport projects 
Transport  
Narrow focus Wachs (1987, 1989) 
Morris (1990) 
Arvan and Leite (1990) 
Kahneman (1993, 2003) 
 
Knudsen (1976) 
Fouracre et al. (1990) 
Pickrell (1992) 
Auditor General of Sweden 
(1994) 
Mansfield et al. (1994) 
Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997) 
Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) 
Trujillo (2002) 
Odeck (2004) 
Lee (2008) 
Kaliba et al. (2008) 
Broad focus Hall (1980) 
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) 
Szyliowics (1995) 
Bruzelius et al (2003) 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
Mackie and Preston (1998) 
3. Causes and explanations for cost overruns 
3.1 Studies with a narrow focus 
Morris (1990) conducted one of the first empirical studies with a narrow focus on cost overruns in 
large projects. He argues that delays in project implementation and cost overruns have become a 
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regular feature of public sector projects. The average cost overrun found in this study is 82%. As 
far as possible causes are concerned, Morris (1990) concludes that about 20 - 25% can be 
attributed to price increases, and the remaining 70-75% has to be explained in terms of real 
factors, such as delays in implementation. He gives the following main factors as the causes of 
delays and cost overruns: poor project design and implementation, inadequate funding of 
projects, bureaucratic indecision, and a lack of coordination between enterprises.  
The study by Arvan and Leite (1990) focuses on large-scale government sponsored procurement. 
They provide an explanation of cost overruns by assuming that the sponsor cannot pre-commit to 
the compensation paid to the contractor when the contractor has some private cost information.  
Wachs (1987, 1989) reviews several forecasting models in the field of transportation. He finds that 
forecasts are often inaccurate, underestimating costs and overestimating traffic demand. He 
proposes two possible explanations for these optimistic forecasts. Firstly, ‘forecasting is 
inherently exact and the observed errors result from imperfect techniques’. Secondly, ‘travel and 
cost forecasting is deliberately slanted to produce figures which constitute technical justification 
for public works programs favoured on the basis of political rather than economic or technical 
criteria’. Because the forecasting errors are always in the same direction - always an 
overestimation of traffic demand and an underestimation of costs - the first explanation seems, 
according to Wachs, to be less valid. In line with Ascher’s argumentation (1987) he concludes that 
‘the competitive, politically charged environment of transportation forecasting has resulted in the 
continuous adjustment of assumptions until they produce forecasts which support politically 
attractive outcomes’. He identifies three main sources of error in forecasting costs: changes of 
scope, assumed rates of inflation that are lower than actual rates of inflation, and delay. He 
concludes that about 40-90% of the total cost overrun can be explained by these factors, but a 
substantial part remains unexplained. Other causes can be found in the funding system 
commonly found in rail transit projects. There is an incentive with this kind of funding system to 
select the most optimistic assumptions in the development of cost estimates for projects.  
A frequently cited piece of research concerned with forecasting in decision-making is by the 
Nobel prize winner Kahneman. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) 
identify two main biases in forecasting and risk taking. The first bias concerns optimism bias, the 
systematic tendency to be overly optimistic about the outcome. The second bias concerns risk 
aversion, the overly cautious attitudes towards risk.  
Lastly, a more recent study by Lee (2008) examined cost overruns in Korean social overhead 
capital projects. Based on 161 completed projects he concluded that the causes of cost overruns 
can be grouped into several major categories: changes in scope, delays during construction, 
unreasonable estimation and adjustment of project costs, and no practical use of the earned value 
management system.  
Various studies addressed cost overruns for transportation projects specifically. For example, 
Pickrell (1992) investigated the cost overruns and benefit shortfalls of 8 rail transit projects in the 
US. In his study, Pickrell (1992) starts from the premise that forecasters overestimate rail transit 
ridership and underestimate rail construction costs and operating expenses. To understand these 
inaccurate forecasts, he points, on the one hand, to optimism among local officials and to 
inadequate planning processes on the other. He argues that the causes of underestimated costs lie 
in the structure of programmes and the existence of dedicated funding sources that provide few 
incentives for local officials to seek accurate information for evaluating alternatives. Fouracre et 
al. (1990) investigated cost overruns for 21 metro projects worldwide. Nearly all the metro 
systems incurred costs higher than expected. These overruns were attributed to ‘a range of 
factors, including the additional costs of unforeseen service and utility diversions and other civil 
works problems, which could not be offset by contingency allowances; changes in specifications; 
currency devaluation and rises in interest charges’. According to the authors, most of the cost 
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estimates were optimistic because there was little appreciation of the difficulties of the work. In 
addition, authorities lacked the management skills to mitigate errors in project planning and to 
keep effective control of costs. 
The Auditor General of Sweden (1994) is another study with a narrow focus on cost overruns 
involving transport projects. It covered 15 road and rail projects. The average capital cost overrun 
for the eight road projects was 86%, ranging between 2 and 182%, and for the seven rail projects 
this was 17%, ranging from minus 14% to plus 74%. The authors conclude that there is still a 
considerable element that cannot be explained by technical causes.  
The study by Mansfield et al. (1994) considered the causes of cost overrun in Nigerian 
construction projects specifically (highway projects). They concluded that the major variables that 
can lead to excessive project overruns are the financing of and payment for completed works, 
poor contract management, shortages of materials, price fluctuations, and inaccurate estimates 
leading to delays. Other factors which can be identified as usually being responsible for project 
delays and excessive costs are excessive bureaucratic checking and approval procedures, unclear 
definitions of contract terms by the client and insufficient geotechnical investigations at the 
feasibility stage.  
The research by Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997) covers seven tunnel and bridge projects. They 
found an average construction cost overrun for the five completed projects of 14%, ranging from -
10% to 33%.  
The Dutch study by Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) also concentrates specifically on the cost 
overruns of transport projects. In contrast to the findings of most studies, they conclude that in 
cost estimates generally tend to be rather reliable. In most projects, cost overruns were common 
but the extent of cost underestimation varied between 0 and 20%. They identify three common 
causes of cost underestimation in projects: price rises, incompleteness of estimations and 
adjustments to the projects. They do not consider the strategic behaviour of the actors involved to 
have a major impact on cost overruns. They tend to argue that change in social opinion and 
intervention by interest groups, the availability of new technologies, the state of the economy, 
and the tendering method all lead to adjustments in the project which cause cost overruns.  
A more recent study on cost overruns by Odeck (2004) uses statistical analysis to derive the 
average cost overruns and to identify the factors that influence cost overruns. The average cost 
overrun found in this study is rather small at around 7.9%. A striking feature is the large 
standard deviation – 29.2% – indicating a large spread around this average among the individual 
projects. Surprisingly, the cost overrun percentage seems to be higher for smaller projects 
compared with larger ones. (However, the number of large projects is small compared with the 
number of smaller projects.) Regarding the factors that influence cost overruns, it was concluded 
that completion time and the geographical region influence cost overruns, whereas project type 
and workforce do not have an impact. Odeck (2004) argues that larger projects are most probably 
under much better management compared with smaller ones and this is the reason why overruns 
are less predominant among larger projects. As a possible explanation for the tendency that cost 
overruns are higher the shorter the completion time, he argues that the shorter the length of time 
the construction is expected to take, the more difficult it is to predict costs. This would imply that 
uncertainties diminish with time.  
Kaliba et al. (2008) carried out a study into cost escalation and schedule delays in road 
construction projects in Zambia. The main causes of cost escalation were: bad or inclement 
weather due to heavy rain and flooding, scope changes, environmental protection and mitigation 
costs, schedule delay, strikes, technical challenges, inflation and local government pressure. 
Factors that lead to cost escalation are said to include: the size of the project; project scope 
enlargement; inflation; length of time to complete the project; incompleteness of preliminary 
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engineering and quantity surveys; engineering uncertainties; exogenous delays; complex 
administrative structures; and inexperienced administrative personnel (Merewitz, 1973). Cost 
escalation is further compounded by factors such as project location, project conditions, 
environmental mitigation costs, suspension of work, strikes, poor site coordination, expiry of bid, 
local government pressure, political discontinuity and transportation problems (Hall, 1980; NAP, 
2003; Schexnayder, 2003).  
3.2 Studies with a broad focus 
Hall (1980) conducted one of the first empirical studies with a broad focus on inadequate 
planning of large infrastructure projects incorporating cost overruns. The research starts with the 
notion that many of the planning disasters seem to have been initiated on the basis of forecasts 
that were later found to be inadequate and misleading. Searching for a better understanding of 
the failures in planning, Hall (1980) considers planning uncertainty to be an important element 
and makes a distinction between three categories of uncertainty. They are: uncertainty in the 
planning environment, uncertainty in related decision areas and uncertainty about value 
judgments (see: Hall, 1980, for an elaboration on these types of uncertainty). He further considers 
whether the difference between public and private goods has any effect on the planning failures. 
According to Hall (1980), the main problem is the way in which societies plan the output of the 
public good (goods and services which the public is willing to pay for but which the private 
sector is not motivated to provide (Hall, 1980)). Public goods are characterised by non-
exclusiveness and non-control over exclusion (Snidal, 1979). Suppliers of the public good do not 
have the opportunity not to provide the good (non-exclusiveness). This difference between public 
and private goods is particularly important in the research on cost overruns.    
Mackie and Preston (1998) present twenty-one sources of error and bias in the appraisal of 
transport projects. They mainly relate to measurement error and appraisal optimism. They 
conclude that appraisal optimism is the greatest danger in transport investment analysis. 
‘Appraisal optimism happens because the information contained in the appraisal tends to be 
owned by scheme promoters who have obvious incentives to bias the appraisal - deliberately or 
unwittingly’.  
Another study that incorporates a wider scope is the research of Bruzelius et al. (2002) who find 
that differences between forecasts and actual costs, revenues and viability could not be explained 
by the difficulty of forecasting itself. These differences can only be explained by the strategic 
behaviour of project proponents who succeed in biasing forecasts in such a way that it leads to 
the decision to continue with the project instead of to change plans. Three issues are mentioned in 
this respect: the lack of a long-term commitment to the project, rent-seeking behaviour for special 
interest groups, and the tendency to underestimate in tenders in order to get proposals accepted.  
Research by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) focuses on the new politics of infrastructure 
development and distinguishes four political eras. One of the main important conclusions of the 
research relevant here is the following notion: ‘consistent underestimation is an example of the 
tragedy of the commons. It corrodes the public confidence in government overall, and especially 
in proposals with long time frames, even as it helps advance specific projects’.  
Finally, one of the leading pieces of research in the field of cost overruns in large transportation 
infrastructure projects is by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a). They examined 258 projects worldwide, and 
their research identifies cost overruns for several projects. They find that cost overruns are the 
greatest for rail projects, with an average cost overrun of 45%, followed by fixed links (average 
cost overruns of 34%) and road projects (average cost overrun of 20%). Explanations for cost 
overruns are sought through statistical analysis and theoretical considerations. Four categories of 
explanations were distinguished (see for example Flyvbjerg et al. 2002a, Flyvbjerg 2005, Flyvbjerg 
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et al. 2003a). First, technical explanations are indicated, which are forecasting errors in technical 
terms, including inadequate data and lack of experience. Second, there are economic explanations 
that depict the cost underestimation as deliberate and economically rational. Third, psychological 
explanations for cost overruns, including the concepts of planning fallacy and optimism bias, are 
provided. Fourth, political explanations might also explain cost overruns. Strategic 
misrepresentation is an important concept within political explanation.  
To obtain a better overview of the type of causes and explanations, section 4 will categorise these 
causes and explanations.    
4. Categorising causes and explanations  
Table 2 presents the causes and explanations found in the studies considered based on the 
categorisation provided by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a). 
Table 2. Causes and explanations 
Explanation Causes Study 
Technical  Forecasting errors including price rises, poor 
project design, and incompleteness of estimations 
Scope changes 
 
Uncertainty 
Inappropriate organisational structure 
Inadequate decision-making process 
Inadequate planning process 
Morris, Nijkamp and Ubbels,Lee, 
Fouracre, Mansfield et al., Kaliba et al., 
Mackie and Preston    
Nijkamp, Wachs, Lee, Fouracre et al., 
Kaliba 
Hall, Kaliba et al.   
Hall, Mansfield et al., Kaliba et al. 
Bruzelius et al. 
Pickrell 
Economical Deliberate underestimation due to:  
- lack of incentives,  
- lack of resources,  
- inefficient use of resources 
- dedicated funding process 
- poor financing / contract management 
- strategic behaviour 
Pickrell, Wachs 
Odeck, Mansfield et al. 
Hall 
Pickrell, Morris, Wachs, Bruzelius et al.  
Mansfield et al. 
Hall, Bruzelius et al.Arvan and Leite 
Psychological Optimism bias among local officials 
Cognitive bias of people 
Cautious attitudes towards risk 
Pickrell, Kahneman and Lovallo, 
Fouracre et al., Mackie and Preston 
Kahneman and Lovallo 
Kahneman and Lovallo 
Political Deliberate cost underestimation 
Manipulation of forecasts 
Private information 
Nijkamp, Bruzelius et al. 
Wachs, Auditor General of Sweden 
Arvan and Leite 
 
Technical explanations are commonly found in the literature on cost overruns. Price rises, poor 
project design and implementation, and incomplete estimations are all seen as the causes of cost 
overruns. Price rises are difficult to predict in the future, poor project design and implementation 
could be the result of a lack of experience, and incomplete estimates are an indication of 
inadequate data. These are considered variables that influence cost overruns, rather than 
explaining cost overruns themselves. Together with other causes, the cause is part of a technical 
explanation. Scope changes, uncertainty, inappropriate organisational structure, inadequate 
decision-making processes, and inadequate planning processes are all considered technical 
explanations for cost overruns on their own. They mainly relate to difficulties predicting the 
future and are considered ‘honest’ errors. Scope changes indicate changes in the design that were 
not predicted beforehand. These changes involve additional costs. The inappropriate 
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organisational structure, the inadequate decision-making process, and the inadequate planning 
process all indicate inefficiency resulting in costs higher than expected. What we are looking at 
here are an inability to adapt sufficiently well to changing circumstances, accountability and 
control, and planning.  
The lack of incentives and resources, the dedicated funding process, and the inefficient planning 
of public outputs are considered (economic) causes because although they influence the extent of 
cost overrun, they cannot provide an explanation in themselves. Forecasters often lack an 
incentive to provide accurate estimates and accordingly underestimate forecasts because it is in 
their own interest to do so. Due to a lack of resources, decision-makers have to choose between 
projects and this leads to competition. Consequently, project promoters deliberately 
underestimate costs in order to make projects look more attractive and thereby increase the 
chance of being selected. The inefficient use of resources can also result in cost overrun. Inferior 
projects are implemented and resources are spent that cannot be recovered. Lastly, the dedicated 
funding process results in cost overruns. Costs of projects are deliberately underestimated to 
increase the chance of receiving part of the funding. Strategic behaviour is an economic 
explanation for cost overruns on its own. Underestimating costs increases the chance of getting 
the project started. 
Psychological explanations are based on the concepts of planning fallacy and optimism bias. They 
involve peoples’ cognitive bias and their cautious attitudes towards risks When taking decisions. 
In taking decisions with risky prospects, people tend to be risk averse, have near-proportional 
risk attitudes (people are proportionally risk averse) and frame their decision problems narrowly 
(people consider decision problems one at a time, often isolating the current problem from other 
choices that may be pending, as well as from future opportunities to make similar decisions 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993)). The cognitive bias leads to optimistic forecasts resulting in cost 
overruns. And due to the cautious attitude towards risks, people frame an outcome that 
maximises utility. A higher utility is obtained when the project is selected for implementation. 
The chance of being selected is increased when the estimated costs are low, consequently leading 
to underestimation.  
 Political explanations are generally agreed upon in the literature as the main explanation for cost 
overruns. Other explanations (sub-explanations) that fall within this overall category are 
deliberate cost underestimation and forecast manipulation. Costs are deliberately underestimated 
in order to increase the chances of project acceptance. Wachs (1989) argues that cost forecasts are 
manipulated because behaviour is determined on considerations of advocacy rather than 
objectivity. The literature furthermore describes different causes of cost overruns by strategic 
misrepresentation, including: learning, a lack of coordination, a lack of long-term commitment, a 
lack of discipline, organisational and political pressure, and asymmetric information. Learning 
involves the awareness among managers and decision-makers that in order for projects to be 
selected for implementation, forecasts of outcomes have to be highly favourable. Consequently, 
they behave strategically and misrepresent forecasts. The lack of coordination, the lack of long-
term commitment and the lack of discipline make strategic behaviour possible because of the lack 
of consequences that is related to this kind of behaviour. Organisational and political pressures 
cause strategic misrepresentation because forecasts are adjusted to derive the most politically or 
organisationally attractive outcomes. Lastly, asymmetric information is an important cause of 
deliberate underestimation or strategic misrepresentation. Decision-makers have little 
information and are dependent on the information obtained from forecasts. This gives forecasters 
the opportunity to misrepresent information.  
It is recognised within this categorisation of explanations that the difference between economic 
and political explanations is rather small. Both types of explanation use utility as a basis to 
understand behaviour. However, the starting point differs. Whereas economic explanations 
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reason from the lack of incentives and resources and consider this the starting point to strive for 
utility maximisation, political explanations construe this in terms of interests and power 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998). 
5. Plausibility of explanations 
The plausibility of an explanation is partly based on its theoretical embeddedness. When there 
are models, assumptions, premises or concepts behind the explanation, the likelihood of 
understanding the phenomenon of cost overruns increases.  
Table 3 shows that a large variety of theories is used to support explanations. Theories are evenly 
distributed among studies.  
Table 3. Theories in explanations 
Explanation  Theory Study  Type of study 
Forecasting Kahneman and Lovallo, Wachs  
Flyvbjerg et al.  
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport 
Planning Pickrell, Altshuler and Luberoff, Hall  Narrow & transport, Broad & 
various 
Technical  
Decision-making Bruzelius et al.  Broad & transport 
Neoclassical 
economics 
Pickrell, Odeck, Wachs Narrow & transport, Narrow 
& various 
Economical 
Rational choice Hall, Flybjerg et al. Broad & various, Broad & 
transport 
Planning fallacy & 
optimism bias 
Kahneman and Lovallo, Pickrell, 
Flyvbjerg et al., Fouracre et al., Mackie 
and Preston 
Narrow & various, Narrow & 
transportation, Broad & 
transport, Narrow &Transport 
Prospect  Kahneman and Lovallo, Flyvbjerg et al.  Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport  
Psychological 
Rational choice Kahneman and Lovallo  Narrow & various 
Machiavellianism Flyvbjerg et al., Bruzelius et al., Hall, 
Wachs, Morris, Pickrell , Nijkamp and 
Ubbels, Odeck 
Broad & transport, Broad & 
various, Narrow & various, 
Narrow & transport   
Agency Wachs, Flyvbjerg et al., Arvan and 
Leite  
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport, Narrow & various 
Political 
Ethical Wachs, Flyvbjerg et al., Auditor 
General of Sweden 
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport, Narrow and 
transport 
5.1 Technical explanations 
Three theories were used to support technical explanations: forecasting theory, planning theory 
and decision-making theory. Forecasting theory examines estimations in uncertain future 
situations. It studies the understanding of the forecasting process at large and aims to clarify how 
and why the various successes and failures come about (Armstrong, 2001). Failures in estimates 
may arise as a result of the cognitive mind in the forecasting process. Forecasting models were 
used to gain a better understanding of the problems with errors in forecasting techniques or 
inappropriate forecasting approaches that lead to poor cost estimates. Planning theory examines 
how projects and policy are established (Faludi, 1973). Planning concepts were used to refer to 
the inappropriate planning process of projects and the poor design and implementation as a main 
explanation for cost overruns. Lastly, decision-making theory considers government and politics as 
a series of decisions taken by people and institutions that make rational decisions in the light of 
their interests and the circumstances under which they operate (Dunleavy, 1991). This is mainly 
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seen when it is referred to inappropriate institutional arrangements as a reason for cost overruns. 
The three theories are rather different and can be useful to address different parts of the 
explanation.  
5.2 Economic explanations 
Economic explanations were mainly founded on neoclassical economics and rational choice 
theory. Neoclassical economics is a framework for understanding the allocation of scarce 
resources among alternative ends. It sees that incentives and costs play an important role in 
shaping decision making. These notions of incentives in decision making are used in relation to 
cost overruns as follows: ‘The dedicated funding causes little incentive to produce accurate 
figures because accurate figures decrease the chance of receiving part of the funding‘ (Pickrell, 
1992). The premises of neoclassical economics are also used to find an explanation for the 
tendency to deliberately misrepresent information. This is explained by the lack of incentives for 
the planners in their role as ‘advocates’. Rational choice theory aims to understand social and 
economic behaviour. It assumes that the actions of individuals are fundamentally rational and 
people calculate the costs and benefits of an action, recognising their preference functions and 
constraints facing them before taking a decision (Arrow, 1987; Coleman, 1992). The theory is used 
to underlie the explanation that it is economically rational to underestimate costs because it will 
increase the likelihood of revenue and profit. 
Rational choice theory is considered to have considerable potential in explaining cost overruns, 
not only for economic explanations but also for psychological and political explanations. For 
political explanations, it has important implications for the relation between the agent and the 
principal. The theory assumes that individuals choose the best action according to stable 
preference functions and the constraints facing them. When making a decision, the agent searches 
for the best action according to his preferences, taking the interests of the principal into account. 
This might lead to conflicts surrounding the cost estimates.  
5.3 Psychological explanations 
Psychological explanations are addressed by a small number of studies and are based on the 
concepts of planning fallacy and optimism bias, prospect theory and rational choice theory. 
Planning fallacy is used as follows: ‘it is the tendency to underestimate time, costs and risks of 
future actions and at the same time overestimate the benefits of the same actions’. Cognitive 
biases of forecasters such as scenario thinking, anchoring estimations and extrapolation of current 
trends result in optimism bias, the systematic tendency to be overly optimistic. Prospect theory 
(which is part of psychological theory) is used to explain that the optimistic forecasts are a result 
of decision-making involving uncertainties and risk. The explanation of cost overruns based on 
risks can also be founded by rational choice theory which assumes that in their consideration 
people take risk into account in their goal of utility maximisation.  
The concept of planning fallacy and optimism bias are closely related, but because the link with 
cost overruns is stronger for optimism bias, the preference is given to this notion to support 
psychological explanations. Prospect theory is preferred even more so because it provides a more 
comprehensive model for psychological explanations incorporating uncertainty and risks in 
addition to optimistic forecasts. Lastly, rational choice theory is considered a very useful basis for 
understanding cost overruns because it addresses economic, political and psychological elements 
of the phenomenon.   
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5.4 Political explanations 
Three theories underlie political explanations: the concept of Machiavellianism, agency theory, 
and ethical theory. Strategic misrepresentation is the core issue in political explanations and this 
is underlined by the concept of Machiavellianism. This is the person’s tendency to deceive and 
manipulate others for personal gain (Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Christie & Geis, 1970). The concept is 
often used to explain cost overruns as a result of competition among parties for government 
funding or to get projects going. Strategic behaviour is enabled because ‘uncertainties of 
estimates are never brought to the attention of decision-makers’ (Odeck, 2004). Similarly, cost 
overruns can be considered the result of the decision-making process involving many actors with 
different interests acting strategically (possibly involving ‘lying’) leading to sub-optimal results. 
One theory that also incorporates the notion of manipulation is ethical theory, which studies the 
behaviour of people and groups and includes their values, customs and responsibility (Wachs, 
1982; LaFolette, 2000). Costs are underestimated because of a lack of loyalty or responsibility to 
the agent or to a the lack of values in a forecaster’s mind to produce accurate figures. Lastly, 
agency theory is also often used to address the strategic behaviour in political explanations. 
Agency theory (principal agent theory) assumes that people act unreservedly in their own 
narrowly defined self-interest with, if necessary, guile and deceit (Noreen, 1999). Agency theory 
can explain why strategic behaviour is made possible by the concept of asymmetric information. 
It is also used in the context of possible institutional set-ups between parties to guide the 
decision-making on projects. The asymmetric information makes it possible for an agent to take 
strategic advantage of the set-up of the funding process to deliberately under-budget their 
projects in order to see them realised. 
Ethical theory is rather specific and its contribution to a full understanding of cost overruns is 
considered to be small due to its weak relationship with cost overruns. The contribution of the 
concept of Machiavellianism is mainly related to the manipulation element but this is also 
incorporated in agency theory by assuming agents act, if necessary, with deceit. Agency theory is 
therefore held to be the most comprehensive theory. It is considered promising in bringing about 
a more general understanding of the phenomenon of cost overruns because it can also underlie 
economic explanations. The relationship between the agent and the principal is characterised by 
the utility maximising behaviour of agents, hence, the link with the economic causes of cost 
overruns. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations  
This paper provides an overview of the different explanations for cost overruns; the most 
commonly used explanations are: economic rational behaviour, strategic behaviour, optimism 
bias, structure of the organisation, relationship between actors and actors’ values and their 
relationship to the environment. The explanations can be grouped into four different categories: 
technical explanations, economic explanations, psychological explanations, and political 
explanations. In addition, the theoretical embeddedness of the explanations was investigated. 
The extent of the use and the variety of theories used in the literature is actually quite large. Table 
4 indicates which theories are considered most appropriate to support the explanations for cost 
overruns for each category of explanations. 
Considering the wide variety of explanations and theories, we recommend focusing on the type 
of explanation before applying a specific theory to better understand the cost overruns in 
projects. Each type of explanation requires the use of a different theory to understand the way in 
which cost overruns appeared. Political explanations are the most dominant and agency theory 
(principal-agent theory specifically) is therefore recommended as a basic theory to understand 
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cost overruns. Agency theory is considered to be the most interesting for the following reasons. 
First, it is rather specific, and can address cost overruns specifically. Secondly, an initial attempt 
to use the theory to understand cost overruns has already been made indicating its relevance. 
And lastly, the theory makes use of several disciplines, including politics, economics and 
sociology, which makes the theory fairly complete. However, although agency theory is quite 
comprehensive, it is to be expected that there may be aspects that cannot be addressed 
appropriately by agency theory. It might not be the all-embracing theory that can be applied to 
understand and explain cost overruns by political theories. If that is true, an eclectic theory needs 
to be defined that is based on agency theory but also includes the ‘best’ insights of other theories. 
Therefore, the recommendation is to search for other promising theories that can help bring 
about a better understanding of cost overruns. Theories in the fields of political science, 
economics or institutions are considered useful. In addition, research into the explanations of cost 
underestimation with respect to contingencies and explanations regarding demand forecasts is 
considered valuable. 
Table 4. Appropriate theories for explaining cost overruns 
Sub-category of explanations Appropriate theories 
Political explanations Machiavellianism 
Agency theory 
Technical explanations Forecasting theory 
Planning theory 
Economic explanations Neoclassical economics 
Rational choice theory 
Psychological explanations Prospect theory 
Rational choice theory 
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